



**NOTTSMUN 2024**

**UNSC**

**STUDYGUIDE**



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## Introduction to the chairboard

### President - Prathu

I am a Computer Science student at University of Nottingham and an avid participant in MUNs, especially in the Security Council. It demands sharp minds tackling critical global issues. As your Chair, I aim to create a stimulating yet inclusive space for thought-provoking debate and a rewarding MUN experience.

### President - Aamir

I am a History student at the University of Nottingham. I enjoy debating current affairs and geo-politics. I enjoy travelling because of the insight it provides into other cultures. My favourite aspect of MUN is the diverse people and opinions that it attracts. MUN is a society that allows for dialogue and debate and that is what makes it special.

## Introduction to the committee

This esteemed body, established in 1945 under the United Nations Charter, holds the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

### A Brief History:

Emerging from the ashes of World War II, the UNSC was envisioned as a body capable of preventing future conflicts through collective action. Composed of 15 member states, five permanent; France, Russia, the United Kingdom, United States and China (Initially held by the Republic of China). Following the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the People's Republic of China took control of mainland China. However the Kuomintang Party supported by the USA became China's UN representative despite the fact that they did not control a majority of Chinese territory. In 1971 the UN formally recognized the People's Republic of China as the legitimate representative of China on the UNSC, replacing the Republic of China). The People's Republic of China became a permanent UNC member giving it veto power.

There are ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly. The current members include:

Algeria (2025), Ecuador (2024), Guyana (2025), Japan (2024), Malta (2024), Mozambique (2024), Republic of Korea (2025), Sierra Leone (2025), Slovenia (2025), Switzerland (2024)



While the non-permanent members for this NottsMUN are : Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Japan, Switzerland, Slovenia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger

### **Unique Powers and Functions:**

The UNSC's can investigate disputes, determine threats to peace, **authorise use of force**, impose sanctions, and admit new members to the United Nations.

### **Procedures and Debate:**

The UNSC adheres to established Rules of Procedure similar to other deliberative bodies. However, one crucial distinction sets the UNSC apart: the veto power held by its five permanent members (China, France, Russia, UK, and US). This veto power allows any permanent member to single-handedly block a resolution, regardless of support from other members. While intended to ensure consensus and prevent unilateral action, it can also hinder the UNSC's ability to respond effectively to crises. Debates and decision-making often involve complex negotiations and manoeuvring around potential vetoes, influencing compromise and the final resolution content.

## **Agenda Item: Terrorism in the Sahel Region**

### **Background:**


The Sahel, a vast semi-arid belt stretching across Africa from Senegal to Chad, faces a multitude of challenges that create a breeding ground for terrorist groups. Widespread poverty, with 1 in 3 facing food insecurity, and limited access to basic necessities like healthcare and fuel leads to frustration and desperation, making the region vulnerable to extremist narratives. This, coupled with corruption within fragile states with limited security forces, hinders their ability to control vast territories and effectively counter terrorist activities. Furthermore, long, unguarded borders facilitate the cross-border movement of fighters and weapons, while unresolved ethnic and political tensions can be easily manipulated by extremists to sow division and incite violence. Finally, climate change and desertification exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, pushing communities towards desperation and making them susceptible to extremist narratives as resources like water become scarce. These complex and interconnected challenges present a significant obstacle to achieving peace and stability in the Sahel.

### **Rise of Terrorism:**

Since the early 2010s, the Sahel region has experienced a troubling surge in terrorist activities, prominently driven by groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram.



Their methods involve violent attacks, ranging from bombings and armed assaults to the kidnapping of civilians, security forces, and government officials. Beyond the immediate human toll, these groups are actively working to destabilise the region. They aim to undermine stability by gaining control of territory, disrupting vital trade routes, and impeding development efforts. Exploiting social grievances and economic hardships, they engage in radicalization and recruitment, drawing in new members while disseminating their extremist ideologies. This multifaceted approach poses a severe threat, not only through direct violence but also by eroding the foundations of regional peace and development



### Timeline:

#### Pre-2010:

1990s: Rise of regional armed groups and ethnic tensions, particularly in Mali and Niger.

2003: Formation of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) through merger of Algerian militant groups.

2007: Boko Haram insurgency intensifies in Nigeria, spilling over into neighbouring countries.

#### 2010-2012:

2010-2011: Tuareg rebellion and subsequent coup d'état in Mali create a power vacuum exploited by AQIM and other extremist groups. (<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13881978>)

2012: AQIM and its allies capture northern Mali, prompting French military intervention (Operation Serval). (<https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/africa/us-weighing-how-much-help-to-give-frances-military-operation-in-mali.html>)



## 2013-Present:


2014: Formation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force by Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad to combat terrorism.

2017: France launches Operation Barkhane to focus on regional counterterrorism efforts beyond Mali. ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Barkhane](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barkhane))

2019-2022: Spillovers of violence from Burkina Faso and Mali into Niger and other Sahelian countries.

### Sahel crisis casualties from 2019 attacks

Worst-hit regions



Source: acleddata.com

[Figure 0.01 : Sahel casualties in 2019 attacks, ([source](#))]

BBC

2020-Present: COVID-19 pandemic exacerbates economic and social vulnerabilities, potentially creating opportunities for extremist recruitment.

(<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/12/15/the-world-bank-boosts-support-to-the-sahel-for-a-resilient-recovery-from-the-security-and-economic-crisis>)

July 2022: Major attack on Malian military camp highlights ongoing terrorist threat.

(<https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/dozens-killed-double-attack-mali-army-camp-village-2023-12-13/>)

October 2023: France announces drawdown of Operation Barkhane, raising concerns about future security landscape. (<https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230906-fewer-drones-aerial-assets-france-plans-reduction-of-military-presence-in-niger>)



**[Figure 0.02: Niger's national police officers stand guard as protesters gather outside the Nigerien and French airbase in Niamey on August 30, 2023 to demand the departure of French troops. © AFP ([source](#))]**

## Discussion

The persistence of terrorism in the Sahel can be attributed to a combination of factors. Beyond the immediate threat, this discussion explores the interconnected web of vulnerabilities, the Sahel's struggle against terrorism requires nuanced examination, these struggles can be traced into:


# I. Humanitarian Refugees, Internal displacement, food insecurity economic deprivation

The Sahel is a vast semi - arid region; it is currently experiencing a severe humanitarian and protection crisis. The political, security and economic situation in the sahel is deteriorating in light of recent coups d'états, and the expanding armed conflict with islamist insurgents. As a result the region now has huge numbers of refugees and internally displaced people(IDP). The UNHCR estimates there are 5 million displaced peoples and 2.9 million IDPs in the region.(Source:UNHCR,Sahel,Situation,January,2024:

<https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sahelcrisis>)



[Figure 1.00: Sahel conflict leaves 2.5M people displaced in past decade, ([source](#))]



Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.  
 \*Source: ACLED events associated with air/drone strikes, armed dashes, attacks, looting/property destruction, non-state actor overtakes territory and shelling/artillery/missile attack in 2019  
 Displacement data: ACLED, CMR CONASUR, DRC, ECHO, IOM DTM, IRC, local authorities, local media, MSF, NADMO, OCHA, Protection Cluster, SEMA, REACH, RRM, UNHCR, 2019  
 The boundaries and the names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.






[Figure 1.02: Sahel conflict IDPs for 2019, (source) ]

Many communities in the Sahel are pastoralist meaning they are highly vulnerable to changing the climate leading to further food scarcity exacerbating the ongoing crisis of instability. Over 13 million people in the Sahel face severe food insecurity, often struggling to access basic necessities like food and water. Malnutrition, particularly among children, is widespread, leading to increased vulnerability to disease and stunted development.

Beyond the immediate suffering, the Sahel crisis casts a long shadow on the region's future. Disruptions to education due to displacement and insecurity leave children and youth with limited prospects, hindering development and perpetuating poverty. This fuels social cohesion challenges, as exacerbated poverty, marginalisation, and lack of opportunities create fertile ground for radicalization and recruitment by armed groups, tearing apart communities and eroding trust.

Furthermore, the crisis spills over to neighbouring countries, straining resources and potentially triggering regional instability due to competition for scarce resources.



[Figure 1.03: SAHEL Humanitarian Overview, (source) ]

## II. Financing Terrorism in the Sahel

Financing terrorism in the Sahel remains a complex and evolving challenge, fueling the activities of jihadist groups like JNIM and ISGS and undermining regional stability. Understanding the sources, methods, and impact of this financing is crucial for devising effective counter-terrorism strategies.

Criminal activities are a significant source of funding for jihadist groups in the Sahel. Between 2008-2023, they raked in an estimated \$40-65 million through kidnappings, targeting government officials, civilians, and aid workers. JNIM and ISGS have reportedly seized control of key trafficking routes, levying taxes on drug shipments and generating substantial revenue. This is just a piece of the pie, as the UNODC estimates the illicit drug trade in West and Central Africa brings in a staggering \$68 billion annually. Jihadist groups further tighten their grip on finances by imposing "zakat" taxes on local populations and businesses operating in areas



under their control. These taxes are estimated to generate millions annually for groups like JNIM, solidifying their financial power.



**[Figure 2.00: Terrorists Target the Sahel's Gold Mines, ([source](#)) ]**

While the specific details remain murky, two concerning sources emerge: private donations and potential state sponsorship.

Firstly, donations from wealthy individuals and diaspora communities, often facilitated through informal hawala money transfer systems, raise concerns due to their lack of transparency and potential links to extremism. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) estimates a staggering \$500 billion flows through these informal channels globally each year, highlighting the difficulty of tracking their true purpose.

Secondly, accusations of state sponsorship from certain actors, although lacking concrete evidence, further complicate the issue. Such allegations create a tangled web of geopolitical dynamics and hinder international cooperation in tackling the crisis. Notably, the UN Security Council Resolution 2688 (2023) expresses concern about "the potential for external actors to exacerbate the conflict by contributing to the financing and equipping of terrorist groups" underlining the urgency of addressing this aspect of the problem.



These groups in the Sahel employ a diverse toolbox to finance their activities, exploiting both traditional and evolving methods.

Cash remains king, as the prevalence of cash-based economies throughout the region makes tracking and disrupting financial flows exceedingly difficult. However, jihadist groups are constantly adapting, increasingly turning to mobile money platforms. This growing trend raises concerns about existing regulatory gaps and the potential for misuse, especially considering the World Bank's estimate that the mobile money market in Sub-Saharan Africa reached a staggering \$558 billion in 2022. Finally, while concrete evidence is limited, the potential future challenge of cryptocurrency use by these groups looms large. The anonymity and borderless nature of cryptocurrency pose significant difficulties for monitoring and mitigation, prompting the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to continuously monitor and research its use for illicit activities.



**[Figure 2.00: Terrorists Target the Sahel's Gold Mines, ([source](#)) ]**

Channelling their acquired funds towards various objectives, all contributing to their overall aim of expanding influence and perpetuating the conflict.

Firstly, they prioritise funding military operations, which entails procuring weapons, ammunition, and training for fighters. This bolsters their capacity to launch attacks, seize territory, and maintain control. Secondly, they engage in bribing officials and securing local support. This tactic allows them to buy influence, undermine counter-terrorism efforts, and create safe havens within communities. Furthermore, jihadist groups exploit funds to provide social services. Offering basic necessities like food and healthcare serves as a propaganda tool and recruitment strategy, enticing vulnerable populations to join their cause.

Finally, they dedicate resources to strengthening media and communication. This involves producing and disseminating propaganda to spread their ideology, maintain an online presence, and potentially recruit internationally.

The consequences of these financing activities are far-reaching and detrimental. Prolonged conflict is a major concern, as sustained funding allows jihadist groups to continue their



activities, hindering efforts to restore peace and stability. Additionally, development is undermined as resources are diverted away from essential services and economic growth, further crippling affected communities. The funding often originates from criminal activities like kidnapping, perpetuating human rights abuses and inflicting suffering on innocent civilians. Furthermore, the opacity and potential misuse of funds erode public trust in governments and international actors, hindering cooperation and hampering efforts to address the crisis.

However, there are positive developments in combating terrorist financing. Enhanced international cooperation through initiatives like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the G5 Sahel efforts aim to improve coordination and collaboration, leading to more effective tracking and disruption of terrorist financing networks. Additionally, targeted sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on individuals and entities linked to terrorism in the Sahel restrict their access to resources and hinder their ability to move funds, disrupting their activities. These positive developments, alongside continued efforts to address the root causes of the conflict, offer hope for a more stable and secure future for the Sahel region.

### **III. Peacekeeping Missions**

Amidst the turmoil, numerous peacekeeping forces have been deployed with the aim of stabilising the region, protecting civilians, and facilitating peacebuilding efforts. However, the effectiveness of these missions has been subject to considerable debate, raising questions about whether they are adequately fulfilling their mandates and contributing to lasting peace.

Peacekeeping forces in Sahel:

- MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali): The largest peacekeeping mission in the Sahel, mandated to protect civilians, promote human rights :15,000 military personnel and 1,800 civilian personnel, and support the Malian peace process.

<https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15341.doc.htm>



- G5 Sahel Joint Force: Conduct joint counterterrorism operations, secure borders, and restore state authority in remote areas. 5,000 troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel>

#### A. MINUSMA:

Operating across 13 major cities and towns, such as Mopti, Gao, and Kidal, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) strategically positions itself to provide protection and monitoring. Covering over 800 km daily, the mission's presence extends to rural areas, including the Gourma region, effectively deterring attacks and engaging with over 800 communities, such as those in Timbuktu, to foster trust and gather critical information.

In terms of operations, MINUSMA has played a crucial role in humanitarian efforts. In 2022 alone, the mission escorted over 15,000 humanitarian convoys, ensuring the delivery of essential aid to those in need. Moreover, MINUSMA intervened in over 300 situations of imminent violence, such as inter-communal clashes in Mopti, showcasing its commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region.



[Figure 3.00: MINUSMA at a Crossroads, ([source](#))]

However, MINUSMA has faced significant challenges, as evidenced by its documentation of 2,500+ human rights abuses. This includes instances of extrajudicial killings and arbitrary



arrests by both Malian forces and armed groups. The Moura massacre in March 2023, allegedly involving Malian soldiers and Wagner Group mercenaries, has brought attention to the ongoing human rights challenges faced by the mission, and the incident is currently under investigation.

Despite these challenges, MINUSMA has achieved some positive outcomes. Notably, the joint operation Barkhane, conducted in January 2020 in collaboration with French forces, successfully dismantled a major jihadist base in the Gourma region, seizing weapons and munitions. Additionally, MINUSMA's escorts have played a pivotal role in protecting humanitarian convoys, significantly reducing attacks on aid deliveries and ensuring crucial assistance reaches vulnerable populations [source: <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/protection-civilians>].

However, negative aspects persist. The Moura massacre underscores the limitations of MINUSMA's mandate, particularly in addressing egregious human rights violations involving external actors. Moreover, the mission has experienced limited impact on political reconciliation, with key provisions of peace agreements remaining unimplemented and inter-communal violence persisting [source: <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15341.doc.htm>]. The overall impact of MINUSMA is a complex interplay of achievements and challenges, reflecting the ongoing complexities of peacekeeping efforts in the Sahel region.

## **B. G5 Sahel Joint Force:**

Established in capitals like Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and N'Djamena (Chad), the G5 Sahel Joint Force coordinates intelligence and plans joint operations to address security challenges in the region. Operating along vast, porous borders, the force aims to prevent the cross-border movement of militants and weapons. However, it faces resource limitations, often lacking sufficient equipment and training. Despite these challenges, the force is deployed to respond to major attacks and threats in vulnerable areas such as the Liptako Gourma region.



[Figure 3.01:G5 Sahel countries, ([source](#)) ]

In terms of operations, the G5 Sahel Joint Force conducted over 100 operations in 2022, targeting militant camps and disrupting supply chains. While some key jihadist figures were neutralised, major groups like JNIM and ISGS remain active. The force also engages in facilitating humanitarian access to conflict zones, but ongoing insecurity and logistical hurdles lead to mixed success.

The outcomes of G5 Sahel Joint Force's efforts indicate limited successes, with some jihadist leaders neutralised and operations disrupted in specific areas. However, major groups persist largely unchecked. Ongoing inter-communal violence and displacement remain critical issues, with 5.2 million internally displaced persons in the Sahel, fleeing violence and human rights abuses.

Positives include Operation Bourgo 4 in 2022, a joint operation involving Burkina Faso and Niger forces that successfully neutralised a major ISGS commander and disrupted their operations in the Liptako Gourma region. Additionally, the force plays a crucial role in securing key infrastructure, protecting water points, and transportation routes, enabling economic activity and humanitarian access in some areas.

On the negative side, the G5 Sahel Joint Force grapples with challenges such as lack of resources, coordination, limited funding, equipment, and training, hindering its effectiveness against well-armed jihadist groups [source: <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/9/26/to-fight-extremism-in-the-sahel-we-need-to-talk-more>]. Inter-communal violence persists despite efforts to secure borders and deter militant movement, displacing millions in the region, highlighting complex social and political



dynamics beyond the G5 Sahel's mandate [source: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/nigeria/sahel-dashboard-humanitarian-overview-28-august-2023>].




**[Figure 3.02:** *Taigué Ahmed, dancing in the centre here, leads Refugees on the Move, an initiative to use dance to enhance inter-community dialogue in different parts of Africa [UNESCO], (source) ]*

#### **IV. Strengthening national security forces (coup's and foreign military involvement)**

The fight against terrorism in the Sahel is intricately tied to the efforts of national security forces confronting jihadist groups like JNIM and ISGS. However, their effectiveness is impeded by a complex interplay of internal and external factors, raising significant questions about their true potential and the overall impact on the region's security.






**[Figure 4.00: Major Regional Security Efforts in the Sahel, ([source](#)) ]**

Internally, Burkina Faso faced challenges following the January 2022 coup, leading to concerns about democratic backsliding and human rights abuses. Similarly, in Mali, the military junta's grip on power, coupled with the involvement of the opaque Wagner Group, complicates counter-terrorism efforts. National forces throughout the Sahel struggle with insufficient training, equipment, and funding, hindering their capacity to effectively counter well-equipped and mobile jihadist groups. Allegations of human rights abuses and corruption by these security forces erode public trust and hinder cooperation with local communities, crucial for intelligence gathering and countering radicalization.

Externally, support from entities like the French Barkhane and the Takuba Task Force has shown short-term successes, but concerns linger about their limited impact on root causes and the potential for fueling anti-French sentiment. The presence of the Russian Wagner Group in Mali raises apprehensions about accountability, human rights abuses, and the potential exacerbation of regional instability.

Diverse counterterrorism efforts involve military operations, development programs addressing root causes, governance reforms, and humanitarian assistance. Despite these initiatives, the security situation in the Sahel remains fragile, with ongoing attacks and kidnappings reflecting the persistent threat of terrorism.



[Figure 4.01: Armed groups in the Sahel, ([source](#)) ]

Limited progress is evident, as jihadist groups like JNIM and ISGS remain active, launching deadly attacks and displacing millions. The conflict claimed over 2,500 lives in 2023 alone. Human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary arrests by both state and non-state actors, persist, raising concerns about accountability and the potential for radicalization. Such abuses undermine trust and cooperation with local communities, further fueling radicalization and hindering intelligence gathering.

The displacement crisis, affecting over 5 million people internally, creates a humanitarian emergency and strains resources [source: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/nigeria/sahel-dashboard-humanitarian-overview-28-august-2023>]. The complex and volatile security landscape, combined with coups, limited resources, and the mixed-effects of external interventions, collectively hinders progress against jihadist groups.


## V. International involvement

International involvement in the Sahel region is marked by the contributions of key players such as France, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the United States, and Russia all playing crucial roles in the efforts to combat terrorism. France spearheaded Operation



Barkhane in 2013, deploying over 5,000 troops primarily in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. While Barkhane aimed to disrupt jihadist networks, train local forces, and support regional stabilisation, its impact on controlling territory was limited, and its presence fueled anti-French sentiment. The subsequent withdrawal from Mali in August 2023 added uncertainty to the region's security dynamics.

Complementing Barkhane, the European-led Takuba Task Force initiated in 2020 trained over 500 Malian soldiers, yet its sustainability faced challenges post the French withdrawal, with a limited impact on broader conflict dynamics. Concurrently, the Russian Wagner Group, a private military company allegedly tied to the Kremlin, has deployed mercenaries to Mali since 2021. Opaque operations, accusations of human rights abuses, and unclear objectives raised concerns about their role, undermining regional trust and fueling anti-Western sentiment.



**[Figure 5.00: International Efforts in the Sahel, (source) ]**

The European Union (EU) has been a financial and political supporter of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, contributing to development projects and engaging in peacebuilding efforts. Despite its substantial funding of over €1 billion for education, healthcare, and infrastructure to address root causes, internal divisions and bureaucratic hurdles have limited its overall effectiveness.

The African Union (AU) deploys the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission and supports regional dialogue and mediation efforts. However, funding shortfalls, mandate limitations, and the



challenges of limited resources and high casualties among peacekeepers contribute to growing criticism of its effectiveness.

The United States plays a role by providing military assistance and training to regional forces, conducting drone strikes against jihadist leaders, and participating in intelligence-sharing initiatives. Concerns persist about the sustainability of its commitment, long-term involvement, civilian casualties, and the limited long-term impact on conflict dynamics. The collective efforts of these international actors form a complex and evolving landscape as they navigate the challenges and complexities of addressing terrorism in the Sahel.

China and Russia have also entered the fray in the Sahel, each driven by distinct interests. China, primarily focused on economic gains, has invested heavily in resource extraction, particularly in Mali's vast lithium reserves, estimated at 10 million tonnes, crucial for its technological ambitions. Additionally, China's trade with the region exceeds \$20 billion, highlighting its significant economic footprint.

Russia, on the other hand, pursues a more multifaceted approach. While it sells arms and trains local militaries, its most notable involvement comes through the Wagner Group, a private military company with an estimated 400 mercenaries in Mali. Though their exact purpose remains unclear, their presence coincides with growing anti-French sentiment.

## Blocs

### **Neutral Bloc: Japan, Switzerland, Slovenia**

This group is likely to prioritise humanitarian aid and development assistance to address the root causes of conflict in the Sahel. Members could potentially cooperate with all others on specific issues like humanitarian aid and development. However, they might adopt a cautious approach to avoid taking sides in any potential power struggles.

### **Western Bloc: France, US Mozambique, UK**

This Block shares common interests in counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel region, aiming to combat violent extremist groups. They also prioritise promoting regional stability and security cooperation while upholding international law and human rights principles. Relations with other blocks indicate potential collaboration with the African Block on shared security concerns.



### **African Block: Sierra Leone, Algeria, Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso**

Bloc is likely to prioritise addressing the root causes of conflict and instability within the Sahel region. Their focus lies in promoting regional ownership of security initiatives, and ensuring respect for African sovereignty and self-determination.

### **Economic Block: China, Russia**

Share interests in countering Western influence in Africa, promoting an alternative international order, and expanding their economic and political influence in the region. Securing access to resources and strategic partnerships in Africa is a central goal. There could be opportunities for cooperation on specific issues like infrastructure development or resource extraction, depending on the terms and conditions considering both countries' investments in the region.

### **Important Considerations:**

- ❖ The alignments can be fluid and may shift based on specific issues and evolving geopolitical dynamics.
- ❖ Collaboration and cooperation between different Blocks, even on specific issues, are still possible despite broader differences.
- ❖ It's crucial to consider the perspectives of the Sahelian countries themselves and ensure their voices are heard and their needs are addressed when discussing solutions to the region's challenges.

## **Questions to consider**

### **Long-Term:**

- *How can a resolution integrate military and security measures with investments in development, governance, and human rights to create a sustainable solution?*
- *What concrete steps can be taken to strengthen regional cooperation and information sharing between Sahelian states and international partners?*
- *How can international aid and development efforts be better targeted to address underlying issues like poverty, climate change, and weak governance?*
- *How can greater cooperation be achieved between countries in the Sahel to address cross-border security threats and share resources effectively?*

### **Short-Term :**

- *What incentives can be offered to encourage all actors to prioritise collective action against terrorism over short-term national interests?*



- *How can peacekeeping mandates and rules of engagement be strengthened to provide more effective protection for civilians and deter attacks?*
- *What steps can be taken to ensure transparency and accountability within peacekeeping missions?*

## Further reading

<https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/going-to-extremes-podcast-unoct-international-hub-behavioural-insights-counter-terrorism> : podcast series by the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism. It discusses the five phases of the trajectory to radicalization and violent extremism.

<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/TF-in-West-Africa.pdf> FATF report on western Africa, detailed analysis of finances for the region.

[https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel#:~:text=Meanwhile%2C%20extremist%20violence%20has%20surged,Event%20Data%20Project%20\(ACLEDE\)](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel#:~:text=Meanwhile%2C%20extremist%20violence%20has%20surged,Event%20Data%20Project%20(ACLEDE)) : discusses the historical context, current actors, and recent developments

<https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/cct/counter-terrorism-in-the-sahel> :spread of terrorism and violence in the Sahel and why has the United Nations become involved.

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